

THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT

Concerning the Dispatch and Withdrawal of the Army and Navy Forces.

The Outline and Progress of the Military Operations of the KWANTUNG Army.

- (The Headquarters of the KWANTUNG Army March 3rd, 1932.)
- (Outline of the KWANTUNG Army's Operations)
- (By the Headquarters of the KWANTUNG Army)
- (From 19 Sept. 1931 to Feb. 1932)

(1) The Disposition of the KWANTUNG Army and the CHINESE Army in MANCHURIA prior to the Incident. The disposition of the KWANTUNG Army before the Incident is as of supplementary map (1) and those of the North-Eastern Defense Army is as of Supplementary map (2).

In order to meet the frequent occurrences of Anti-Japanese events prior to the Incident, the Army studied emergent measures and completed preparations for any untoward happenings.

(2) Movement of the KWANTUNG Army. Determined to set out.

On September 18, at 11:46 P.M., the Chief of Staff receives the following telegram from the Special Service Corps (TOKUJU-KIKAN) at MUKDEN:

"A little after ten o'clock in the evening of the 18th, reports was received that the outrageous Chinese Troops destroyed the South Manchurian Railway lines west of the Big Northern Barracks in the north of MUKDEN, attacking our guards and clashing with our defense forces. In view of this report, the 2nd Infantry Battalion of the MUKDEN Independent Garrison is now on its way to the place of engagement."

On the following day at 0:28 A.M., the Chief of Staff /T.N. Major General Miyake Mitsuharu in pencil/ received from the MUKDEN Special Service Corps the following telegram:

"The Chinese troops at the Big Northern Barracks blew up the Manchurian Railway lines. The strength of the forces are estimated at three or four companies. They have gradually fled into their barracks. A little after 11 o'clock, our company at HUSHITAI are fighting with five or six hundred enemies at the Great Northern Barracks, and although we have occupied a corner of the place, the enemy is now increasing their machine guns and infantry guns. Our company is now fighting against heavy odds; and 1st Lt. NODA has been severely wounded."

Since the fighting between the Chinese and the Japanese troops was thus begun, and what is more, we were challenged by the Chinese, we are determined to fulfil our duty by concentrating our main forces in MUKDEN, inflicting a hard blow on the Chinese Army, and eliminating the root of the evil. However, at that time, the strength of our KWANTUNG Army guarding the 1,000 kilometers of the Manchurian Railway lines totaled not more than 10,000 men, (out of which 1,500 men were stationed at MUKDEN) while the Chinese regular troops at MUKDEN alone numbered about 19,000. Combining the Chinese regular army and the irregular army together, the enemy forces in the eastern four provinces numbered 220,000. In case of emergency, therefore, the only way to protect the railroads extending to such a long distance and to preserve the lives and properties of our compatriots numbering one million, is to concentrate our main forces quickly, and taking the initiative by annihilating the pick of enemy forces in the vicinity of MUKDEN and thereby to control the nerve center of the Eastern four provinces. Furthermore, in order to secure the defense of the S.M.R. lines south of MUKDEN and thus maintain the freedom of operation, especially, without delaying the transportation of reinforcements from the direction of KOREA, it is necessary to clear away the Chinese Army promptly in the neighbourhood of FENING HUANG-CHENG, ANTUNG and YINGKOW, adjacent to the Manchurian railroads.

Battle in the vicinity of MUKDEN.

Just at that time the Staff Officer Colonel ITAGAKI was at MUKDEN. On the outbreak of the event, the Colonel decided on his own initiative at once to attack on the Great Northern Army Barracks without waiting for the concentration of the main forces.

Since our troops started the attack on the enemy, at the Great Northern Army Barracks, it became an utmost necessity to safeguard the rear and at the same time to repel the enemy within the walled city of MUKDEN which held the position on our flank to which the Colonel ordered the Second Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrison to attack the Chinese at the Great Northern Army Barracks, and the 29th Infantry Regiment to attack the enemy at MUKDEN.

The Chinese Army at the Great Northern Army Barracks resisted stubbornly; but due to the speedy and clever manoeuvre of our troops and especially as they were well trained for night operations, and also because that the enemy in the walled city of MUKDEN fought disjointedly they were dispersed and beaten individually step by step. The battle lasted for 8 hours and at about 6:00 A.M. on the 19th, the Walled City of MUKDEN and the Great Northern Army Barracks fell completely into our hands. With the arrival of our main forces mopping-up operation of enemy troops was carried on in the arsenal, airfield and the Great Eastern Army Barracks, etc., in the vicinity of MUKDEN. At about two o'clock in the afternoon, the operation was almost completed. The main forces of the defeated enemy retreated in the direction of SHENNAI line. A part of them stopped in the vicinity of FUSHUN and another part seemed to have retreated towards HSINMIN.

Battle in the vicinity of CHANG-CHUN.

The third Infantry Brigade (Excluding 29th Infantry Regiment) stationed at CHANG-CHUN learned that a battle was raging between the Japanese and Chinese troops at 00:15 A.M. on the 19th in the vicinity of MUKDEN. The Brigade having decided to advance its main force southward to MUKDEN, immediately started preparation; but at 3:05 A.M. received orders from the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army to remain at CHANG-CHUN and observe the enemy's movement. However, the brigade Commander judged that it was dangerous for him to remain quiet, as the enemy in the vicinity outnumbered his troops several times and since the battle had already commenced in the MUKDEN area. At his own discretion, he at once attacked the Chinese troops in the vicinity. The enemy took position in the barracks and resisted stubbornly. At dawn, the battle became unfavourable to us, with increasing casualties.

At six o'clock in the morning, the Independent Garrison Commander completed entraining his men together with the main force of the First Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrison at KUNGCHULING station (The entraining was delayed, because the train was composed and forwarded from CHENG-CHUN). The Commander learned that, in spite of our troops, in the neighbourhood of MUKDEN winning the battle up to that time, our troops in the vicinity of CHENG CHUN were in an adverse situation. At his discretion, the main force of the First Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrison was sent to CHENG CHUN; and the Commander himself with a guard of one platoon proceeded southward to MUKDEN. Thus, the First Infantry Battalion of the Independent Garrison advanced towards the Chinese army barracks at NANLING; and in co-operation with a part of the 4th Infantry Regiment, they started attacking and joined a fierce battle with the enemy. For instance, the Third Company lost 38 men out of 64 combatants.

Reinforcement by the 39th Mixed Brigade.

The Commander of the army arrived at MUKDEN at noon on the 19th, and learned the various conditions described before. He sent the 30th Infantry Regiment and the main force of the Second Field Artillery Regiment to CHENG CHUN as reinforcement. Prior to this, the Commander had decided to punish the Chinese army, and requested the Commander of the Korean Army to despatch reinforcements. The reply from the Commander of the Korean Army informed that under the command of the Commander of the 39th Infantry Regiment of the Korean army a unit composed of five infantry battalions, two artillery battalions, and one company each of cavalry and of engineers and two squadrons of airforce (one squadron of reconnaissance planes and one of fighter) would be sent as reinforcement, to the KWANTUNG Army. This unit (except the airforce) was known to arrive at the MUKDEN station between daybreak and two o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th. On the arrival of this unit it was decided to have them detailed for guarding the vicinity of MUKDEN thus relieving the Second Division. The Second Division will be ordered to proceed to CHENG CHUN and to have it prepared for advancing to HARBIN and CHILIN.

that were gradually being plunged into confusion and disorder. At the same time, it was decided that a unit should be dispatched to CHENG CHIA TUN and the neighbouring area of HSIMIN, and then occupy the crossing point of the River LIAO. After all, since the situation became so aggravated, it became necessary for the Army to take further steps for the maintenance of order in the three Eastern Provinces and for the protection of the Japanese residents there. In order to accomplish this, it was deemed absolutely necessary to maintain order not only in the adjacent area of the Manchurian Railroad lines but also in CHILIN, HARBIN and other places.

The occupation of CHENGCHIA TUN, HSIMIN and the crossing point of the River LIAO was necessary for safe-guarding the Manchurian Railroads, in view of the enemy's conditions in the neighbourhood of TAOYUAN, LUNGLO and CHIA CHOW.

- (1) Temporary suspension of the reinforcement from the Korean Army.

However, the Commander of the Kwantung Army received at 11 P.M. from the Commander of the Korean Army a report to the effect that the reinforcement had been ordered by the Chief of the General Staff to remain in the south of Shingishu until further orders. Therefore, on account of its strength the Kwantung Army was obliged to abandon the occupation of the crossing point of the River Liao, but gathered the main forces of the Division and two battalions of the Independent Garrison in the vicinity of Chengchung, for the situations in Kirin and Harbin threatened to become disquieting.

- (3) Spreading of the Incident and the Decision of the Cabinet.

At 6 P.M. on that day, the following telegram was received from the War Minister:

"Concerning the clash between Japanese and Chinese soldiers, the Government of the Empire has decided its policy to do its best to prevent the Incident from spreading, although this Incident was caused by Chinese soldiers' destroying a portion of the South Manchuria Railway and the fault is of course on the part of China. Take action bearing this policy in mind."

Simultaneously the following telegram was received from the Chief of the General Staff.

"1. The determination and disposal of the Commander of the Kwantung Army since the night of Sept. 18 is timely and pertinent and is believed to have enhanced the prestige of the Japanese Army.

"2. Considering the attitude of China since the occurrence of the Incident, the Cabinet decided that the Incident shall be dealt with so as not to exceed the necessary steps. Therefore the action of the Army shall be taken in accordance with the above object."

(4) The Despatch of the Second Division to KIRIN.

As soon as the report concerning the battles between Japanese and Chinese troops near Mukden and Changchung was brought on the morning of 19th to KIRIN, the feelings of the Chinese around Kirin grew gradually worse. And HSI HSL, acting Governor of KIRIN Provincial Government went so far as to declare to the Japanese that he could not take responsibility for protecting the Japanese residents there.

According to the information obtained from Ki-chang Railway Board, it seemed that the main forces of the KIRIN Army had already started moving (direction and number were uncertain). On the evening of the 20th, a report came from OSEAO, Michisada, Lieutenant Colonel and counsellor of KIRIN Army. By this telegram, it was affirmed that the enemy left the city of KIRIN and advanced to a certain direction. The Commander of the Army received at 9:45 P.M. the following telegram which had been sent at 1:40 P.M. by the head of the KIRIN Residents Association:

"The situation in KIRIN has become tense. Some fired at the houses of Japanese residents. A few women and children were evacuated, but the greater part of the residents are unable to leave the city and the danger is increasing every minute. We request the Commander, by the decision of the Association, to take a measure promptly for perfect protection of the residents."

Thus in the vicinity of KIRIN, the danger was by and by drawing nearer to the Japanese residents and the situation could not be left alone. On the other hand, the situation in HARBIN was worsening. If the main forces of the Second Division which were in CHANGCHUN had been sent to KIRIN, the defense along the long Manchurian Railway lines would be weakened. If some part of the railway should have been destroyed, the Army would have been placed in the danger of being divided into two parts, each of which being located in the north and the south at the distance of 400 kilometers. Moreover the Commander had been strongly warned of the spreading of the Incident by the Chief of the General Staff and the War Minister. Therefore, it was necessary to be especially prudent concerning the dispatch of troops to KIRIN. However, at the sight of the danger gradually drawing nearer and the only thing the Japanese people can rely on was a solitary railway, the Commander could not ignore it. Hereupon the Commander thought it necessary to send troops to KIRIN and to give a blow to the Chinese troops, by doing this he can attain the object of protecting the residents there and at the same time, to demoralize the Chinese troops and thus make our Army safe.

Thus it was decided on the 21st of September that the main forces of the Second Division in CHANG CHUN should be sent to KIRIN. The forces left CHANG CHUN at 9:50 A.M. on the 21st for KIRIN, an armoured train running ahead. On the way, the Divisional Commander met Lieutenant-General WANG,

agent of HSI HSL., acting President of the KIRIN Provincial Government; (OSEKO, councillor of the KIRIN Army accompanied WANG) and made an arrangement in respect to our marching into KIRIN. The main forces of the KIRIN Army, being afraid of the Imperial Army, had fled at that time to the north of KIRIN and a part of the Army had escaped to the SHENGLI line. Therefore, our main forces were gathered at KIRIN until 8 o'clock and peace was maintained there. The Commander of the Korean Army despatched at his own discretion the 39th Mixed Brigade.

The Commander of the Kwantung Army received a little past one o'clock on that day from the railway authorities a report to the effect that the 39th Mixed Brigade had crossed the YALU River. But he was half in doubt. At 2:00 P.M. the following telegram was received from the 39th Mixed Brigade:

"The 39th Mixed Brigade, having crossed the boundary line at 1:00 P.M. on the 21st, has come under the command of Your Excellency, and is marching to Mukden."

Hereupon the Army had the 39th Mixed Brigade guard the vicinity of Mukden and gathered all the forces of the Second Division at CHANGCHUN and KIRIN, making preparation for any change in the situation. Owing to this, the conditions in Harbin district which had been dangerous for a while, became gradually settled.

(5) The Bombing of CHINCHOW.

In the vicinity of Mukden and along the railway, remnants of the defeated enemy and bandits were rampant. They plundered and did violence as they liked. Especially not a small number of them killed or raped the Koreans. Hereupon the Army positively vanquished those outlaws and pacified the Koreans and protected all civilians; thus the surroundings became by and by quiet.

During this time, CHANG Hsueh-liang established at Chinchow the provisional Government of Liaoning Province and gathered his troops at that place from various directions and disturbed public peace behind our Army; and instigating the remnants of the defeated troops which had fled to the district east of the Manchurian Railway, tried to attack our Army from two flanks. On account of this, the public feeling along the Railway which had once become settled, began to get somewhat perturbed.

Hereupon the Army had airplanes scout the situation in the vicinity of CHINCHOW. The Chinese fired at us and clearly manifested hostile action, so that at last we bombed and frightened them. Still they instigated partisans and continued their activity implicitly, calling their way of battle "a frontless strategy".

(6) Situation before the Battle. Battle in the vicinity of T.HSING.

CHANG Hai-peng, governor of T.O.M.A.N., declared independence on the 1st of October and began marching northward and, repulsing the weak troops of the Heilungkiang Army on the way, arrived at the right shore of the River NONNI in the middle of October. The Heilungkiang Army, in order to check the Chang Hai-peng Army's marching northward, burned down the bridge of the Taonan-Angangs railway crossing the NONNI River, resulting in complete suspension of the railway traffic. The said railway is the main line of international communication and furthermore it is the sole security of for the Japanese loan by which this railway was built and of which payment of principal and interest was suspended. Destruction of the bridge, which the season for moving of the North-Manchurian special products amounting to some 2,500,000 tons is close at hand, not only inflicts enormous losses on S.M.R. but also has great influence upon the economic life of the Chinese people. Accordingly on October 20, S.M.R. dispatched TAKEMURA, Katsukiyo, Consulting Engineer of the Taonan-Anganghsi Railway, and 4 other men to the scene to make actual investigations. The Heilungkiang Army, however, despite their knowing that TAKEMURA and his party were non-combatants, were so outrageous as to fire at them, making their investigations impossible. Thereafter, S.M.R. entered a strong protest through Consul SHIMIZU at TSITSILAR on November 29, against Ma chan-shan, Acting-Governor of Heilungkiang Province, notifying that repairs should be completed by November 3 fixing a term of one week and that, should he not comply with the notification, the Empire /T.N. JAPAN/ would carry out the repair by force. The Heilungkiang Provincial Government, promising that it would start repairs on November 30, wasted many a day without sincerity from the outset.

The Dispatch of Nunkiang Detachment.

The Heilungkiang Army, then concentrated on the northern shore of the River NONNI, seemed to have as its main forces a unit composed of some 2,000 infantrymen. In view of such an attitude of the Heilungkiang Provincial Government, the Taonan-Anganghsi Railway Bureau and S.M.R., presuming that the repair work would not be completed by November 3, requested the Army to dispatch an escort unit in order that they might, in accordance with the need, commence the repair work on the 4th, the next day. The Army, taking into consideration the general situation, determined to minimize forces to be dispatched and ordered the Nunkiang Detachment (1 infantry battalion, 1 artillery battalion and 1 company of engineers) to march to the place under the command of Colonel HAMAMOTO, Commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment.

The Nunkiang Detachment, concentrated in the vicinity of Cheng-chiatun at midnight of November 1, left there early in the morning on the 2nd and gathered on that night in the vicinity of Tailai and sending scouts, set about reconnaissance. On the same day, the following notice was delivered to M. Chan-shan and CHANG Hai-peng.

Notice:

"The Taonan-Anganghsi Railway Bureau and S.M.R. have now begun to carry out repairs of the railway bridge in the neighborhood of Kiangchiao, on the River NONNI, under the cover of Our Japanese Army. Our Army, therefore, hereby notifies the Heilungkiang Provincial Army and the CHUNG Hai-peng Army of the following matters:

POINT

1. The River/bridge shall not hereafter be put to strategic use.
2. Both armies shall withdraw outside the line for a distance of 10 kilometres from the bridge by noon of December 4 and shall not enter within 10 kilometres from the bridge until the repair work is completed. The date of completing repairs shall be notified as soon as it becomes definite. Against those who do not comply with the above requests, we will lawfully use force by regarding them as harbouring hostility against the Japanese Army. I hereby warn you as mentioned above. On November 2, the 6th year of Showa (1931).

Commander of the Japanese Army, NONJO, Shigeru"

Outbreak of Hostilities.

On the night of Nov. 3, the next day, our engineers repaired the bridge so that soldiers might cross on foot the bridge which had been destroyed. On the 4th, at 3 A.M. a part of the forces led by a company commander occupied the Fifth Bridge, about 3 kilometers south of the Tahsing Station and escorted the repair works of the bridge. However, about 8:30 A.M., the Chief of Staff of the Heilungkiang Army came to the scene in company with Consul SHIMIZU at TSITSILIR. He informed us that they had no intention of resistance and promised us that the first line forces of the Heilungkiang Army would be withdrawn before noon, and left. The dense fog which gathered from morning on that day made it utterly impossible to perceive any movements of the enemy in our front. The 7th Company of the 16th Infantry Regiment, trusting the words of the Chief of Staff of the Heilungkiang Army, left the said Fifth Bridge at noon, marched forward with a large flag of the Rising Sun fluttering at the head of the Company; and each soldier carrying a small flag of the Rising-Sun, the company reached the south of the Tahsing Station, when all of a sudden they were subjected to unlawful firing from various directions by infantry and artillery, and sustained 12 casualties. The Company, consequently, retreated to the Fifth Bridge line to wait for the arrival of the main forces of the Detachment. The main forces of the Detachment, hearing the sudden gun-reports, rushed from the Kiangchiao Station to the front line at about 2:00 P.M.; but, on account of swampy lands outside the railway track through which even infantrymen found it difficult to pass, there was no alternative but to await the arrival of nightfall. The Detachment, on that night, passed through the swampy lands extremely hard to wade, made a detour towards the left flank of the enemy, and opening an attack at daybreak of the 5th, captured some of the enemy's positions. The enemy, however, relying

upon their numerical superiority, came to outflank us vice versa. To make matters worse, at about 3:00 p.m., a corps of some 1,000 made a surprise raid upon our right flank from the left-side. The situation the detachment confronted having become all the more tense, our soldiers were intent on waiting for the arrival of reinforcements.

Arrival of reinforcements.

The Commander of the Kwantung Army at Mukden, on being informed of the opening of hostilities in the evening of the 4th, steadily rushed forces from Chengchiatun and Mukden. However, the battlefield being at a distance of 430 and odd kilometres by railway, it took more than 20 hours to reach there. At midnight of the 6th, about 1 battalion reinforced from Chengchiatun reached the battlefield, followed by the arrival at 6 A.M. of 1 battalion which rushed from Changchun and thus our forces came to number some 1,400. Thereupon, the enemy forces, being unable to resist our resolute attack, retreated to the north, leaving behind many casualties. The Detachment occupied positions in the vicinity of Tahsing and covered the repairing works of the bridge.

7. Battles in the vicinity of Anganghsi.

Our forces, concentrated in the vicinity of Tahsing by November 7, consisted of some 5 infantry battalions, 5 artillery companies, 1 engineer company and 2 air squadrons. In spite of having sufficient strength for pursuing the enemy, our forces in the neighbourhood of Tahsing stopped advancing. It was because we, only desirous of settling the affair peacefully and of doing our best to prevent it from aggrandizing, pocketed the insult and checked the troops burning with hostile feelings.

The enemy, however, acting contrary to our peaceful attitude, stopped in a region as near as the southern side of the Chinese-Eastern Railway line, and mustered its main forces in the vicinity of Anganghsi and moreover, called together considerable numbers of forces from various quarters. The strength of the enemy forces, concentrated in the vicinity of Anganghsi, amounted to some 6,000 of infantry and 3,000 of cavalry. The positions in the neighbourhood of Hsiaohsingtun and Sanchienfang began increasing their strength. The enemy forces at Chinchow, on the other hand, gradually started their activities in concert with these forces and some 10,000 bandits instigated by them, crossing the River Jiao, came to watch for a chance to attack the South Manchurian Railway-line. Just then, a report was received that the situation of the Tientsin district became threatening and that our China Garrison forces had a clash with the Chinese forces there.

In spite of our great efforts to prevent the Affair from aggrandizing, the general attitude of the Chinese forces became positive day by day. Ma Chan-shan, especially, mustered on about the 12th nearly all the strength of the Heilungkiang Army amounting to some 20,000. Ma Chan-shan and his followers, relying upon their numerical superiority and stimulated by encouraging telegrams from CHUNG Hsueh-liang and various other quarters inside the Great Wall, boastfully declared that they would have a decisive battle with the Japanese army. Since their cavalry corps suddenly showed a sign of activity in our front and right flank, an eventual clash came to be absolutely inevitable. Accordingly, the Army, reporting the situation to the Central /T.N. TOKYO/ authorities, was prepared for both peace and war and steadily concentrated the main forces in the vicinity of Taising. The Commander of our Army, even at this moment, desirous of settling the matter peacefully and obeying the wishes of the Central authorities decided on asking Ma Chan-Shan again to reconsider the matter, and on the 14th made recommendations by offering moderate conditions. However, paying hardly any attention to our advice, they destroyed the Taonan-Inganghsai Railway line, harassed our rear and adopted a more defiant attitude than ever. The Army had determined to open an attack after uniting these forces consisting of the Mixed 4th Brigade and various flying corps which were in course of being dispatched from home and were expected to reach there on the 21st or 22nd. On the 16th and 17th, however, the enemy threatened our right flank with a superior cavalry corps and the enemy forces in front as well became active, showing a sign of advancing to make an attack in the early hours of the 18th. Thereupon, the 2nd Division turned to the offensive at daybreak of the 18th with a small force and pressed on to Tsitsihar and captured the city by storm. But as the main forces of the defeated enemy remained as near as Hailun and Kusan where the situation was extremely threatening, the Army had a part of the forces stationed there for some time.

8. Occupation of CHINCHOW.

Public opinion in China Proper being stiffened at the time, CHUNG Kai-shek and CHUNG Hsueh-liang, who seemed to have been influenced by these domestic reasons advanced the forces as mentioned above, into the vicinity of Chinchow to the east of the River Taling and in concert with flying columns, started positive action. Furthermore, placards propagating a declaration of war on Japan were posted in Chinchow and various places along the Mukden-Shanhaikwan railway where rumours of declaring war on Japan were prevalent.

At midnight of November 26, the Army, informed of hostilities having begun between the Japanese and Chinese forces in the vicinity of Tientsin by a report from the Chief of Staff of the Tientsin Garrison, decided on rescuing the Garrison from emergency, and ordered the Mixed 4th Brigade concentrated at the time in the neighbourhood of Mukden and the main body of the 2nd Division at Tsitsihar to advance on the 27th towards the Chinchow district. These forces started action. Towards the evening of that day, however, an order came from the Chief of the General Staff to the effect that the operations of advancing to the Chinchow district should be suspended and at the same time, as the tension in the Tientsin district had been relaxed, the Army withdrew these forces and concentrated them along the South Manchurian railway.

Since then, the Army endeavored to maintain public peace in the region along the South Manchurian Railway.

The Nanking Government, on the other hand, unexpectedly made a proposal to us that a neutral zone should be established in the vicinity of Chinchow at the time when the above-mentioned forces of ours started advancing to the vicinity of this city. However, as soon as our forces completed evacuation to the east of the River Liao, they announced that they were opposed to creating a neutral zone and uttered such treacherous words that the said proposal had been made by the Japanese Army. The proposal made by the Chinese government thus turned out to be a means of suiting their own convenience only by evading our attack on Chinchow. Towards the middle of December, the positions in the vicinity of Chinchow were still more strengthened and the enemy strength concentrated thereabout amounted to some 35,000 men with 60 cannons or so, a powerful unit of which advanced as far as the Mukden-Shanhaikwan railway and Yingkow branch-line quarters, east of the River Taling. Volunteer armies, flying columns and bandits instigated by the enemy numbered 50,000 to 60,000. They, crossing the River Liao as soon as it froze, watched for a chance to attack those quarters along the South Manchurian Railway. In concert with them, bandits in the area of the Antung-Mukden railway came gradually to start active operations.

As the Army found it difficult to discharge its duties merely by guarding the quarters along the South Manchurian Railway, it determined to start suppressing these bandits from the latter part of December, and sent the 2nd Division from the River Liao line on December 28 to carry out the duties of subjugation in the region along the Yingkow branch line. They happened to fight with bandits mixed with powerful regulars in the vicinity of Tienchuangtai and Panshan. Thus, since the fact became clear that the bandits in Liaohsi were supported by Chinese regulars, it was absolutely necessary to annihilate the Chinese regulars in the vicinity of Chinchow in order to maintain public peace in South Manchuria. Hereupon our main forces started advancing on the 30th by way of the Mukden-Shanhaikwan railway. The enemy forces in the vicinity of Chinchow who had previously been so arrogant were now overwhelmed by the strength of the Imperial army and began withdrawing inside the Great Wall without fighting a single battle with us, as a result of which the vicinity of Chinchow became thrown into a lawless state for a while and public peace was about to be disturbed. The Army, therefore, made the 20th Division advance to the vicinity of Chinchow, withdrawing the 2nd Division without delay into the region along the South Manchurian Railway.

9. Despatch of troops to Harbin.

In Kirin Province, although HSIESLA submitted to the newly-established Government, some parties, holding influence in Harbin and Pinksion districts, established an anti-Kirin government, disturbed HSI HSIA's administration, rejected his repeated advice and did not surrender to him.

On account of this the minds of the people in Kirin Province, became unsettled. The Kirin Government, therefore, started military operations on January 5. In the meantime, the Kwantung Army, not desirous of becoming involved in the political strife of any Chinese party, maintained a strictly neutral attitude. The Kirin Army thereafter pressed the anti-Kirin Army hard until they reached the suburbs of Harbin in the latter part of January. On January 27, hostilities were opened between the main forces of these armies in the eastern suburbs of Harbin. Prior to this, the anti-Kirin army steadily dispatched reinforcements to the vicinity of Harbin and a part of same commenced looting. 4 Japanese residents there were slaughtered by them, a few Korean women were carried away, and thus the safety of our residents (about 4,000 Japanese and about 1,500 Koreans) became greatly jeopardized. Accordingly, the Army determined to dispatch to Harbin one unit composed of 2 infantry battalions in order to protect our residents, notifying both armies of having no other intention than safeguarding our residents. The anti-Kirin army, however, destroyed the Southern branch-line of the Chinese Eastern Railway, seized rolling stocks and obstructed our transportation to the utmost. Judging from these facts, the intention of the anti-Kirin army was to do their best to check the Japanese forces proceeding northward, to defeat the Kirin Army in the meanwhile and then to turn to routing the Japanese forces. Thereupon, the Army, for fear that it would be dangerous to make 2 battalions advance to isolated Harbin, decided on dispatching the main forces of the 2nd Division to Harbin. The 2nd Division, being challenged by the anti-Kirin army, opened fire, and on February 5, after defeating them, occupied the city of Harbin. However, since our forces had been unable to deal the enemy forces a decisive blow, it was impossible to stamp out the unrest and instability brooding over North Manchuria. In consequence, it was decided that the 2nd Division should be stationed there for the time being to insure public peace in this region.

10. Disposition of our forces at present.

As mentioned above, the Army has disposed about one-half of the forces in Harbin and Tsitsihara to cope with the present situation, as public peace in North Manchuria is not yet restored. As for the other half, the Army has, in order to insure public peace in Fengtien Province, disposed its main forces in the vicinity of Chinchow and a part of it in the vicinity of Mukden.

On account of this the minds of the people in Kirin Province, became unsettled. The Kirin Government, therefore, started military operations on January 5. In the meantime, the Kwantung Army, not desirous of becoming involved in the political strife of any Chinese party, maintained a strictly neutral attitude. The Kirin Army thereafter pressed the anti-Kirin Army hard until they reached the suburbs of Harbin in the latter part of January. On January 27, hostilities were opened between the main forces of these armies in the eastern suburbs of Harbin. Prior to this, the anti-Kirin army steadily dispatched reinforcements to the vicinity of Harbin and a part of same commenced looting. 4 Japanese residents there were slaughtered by them, a few Korean women were carried away, and thus the safety of our residents (about 4,000 Japanese and about 1,500 Koreans) became greatly jeopardized. Accordingly, the Army determined to dispatch to Harbin one unit composed of 2 infantry battalions in order to protect our residents, notifying both armies of having no other intention than safeguarding our residents. The anti-Kirin army, however, destroyed the Southern branch-line of the Chinese Eastern Railway, seized rolling stocks and obstructed our transportation to the utmost. Judging from these facts, the intention of the anti-Kirin army was to do their best to check the Japanese forces proceeding northward, to defeat the Kirin Army in the meanwhile and then to turn to routing the Japanese forces. Thereupon, the Army, for fear that it would be dangerous to make 2 battalions advance to isolated Harbin, decided on dispatching the main forces of the 2nd Division to Harbin. The 2nd Division, being challenged by the anti-Kirin army, opened fire, and on February 5, after defeating them, occupied the city of Harbin. However, since our forces had been unable to deal the enemy forces a decisive blow, it was impossible to stamp out the unrest and instability brooding over North Manchuria. In consequence, it was decided that the 2nd Division should be stationed there for the time being to insure public peace in this region.

10. Disposition of our forces at present.

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滿洲事變

陸海軍出兵 撤兵關係

No. 1

Defence Doc. #716

No. 2

関東軍作戦行動ノ概要及沿革

昭和七年五月三日

関東軍司令部

関東軍作戦行動ノ概要

自昭和七年九月十九日至同七年二月上旬

(一) 事変前滿洲ニ在リテ関東軍並支那軍ノ配置
事変前ニ在リテ関東軍ノ配置ハ附圖第一ノ如ク東
北邊防軍ノ配置ハ附圖第二ノ如ク
而シテ軍ノ事変前頻發スル毎日事件ノ應
答ノ対策ヲ講究シ其準備ヲ完シ之爲メ豫ニ備

二 関東軍ノ出動

出動ノ決心

九月十八日午後十一時四十分參謀長ハ奉天特務機
關ヨリ左記電報ヲ受領ス
「十八日十時過頃奉天北方北大宮西側ニ在リ暴徒
ナル支那軍隊ハ滿鉄線ヲ破壞シ守備兵ヲ襲撃シ
ト衝突セリト報告ニ依リ奉天獨守備步兵第三大隊ハ
現地ニ向テ出動中ナリ」

次テ十九日午前零時三十分參謀長ハ三宅光治少將ハ奉
天特務機關ヨリ更ニ左ノ電報ヲ受領ス

「北大營ニ在リテ支那軍ハ滿鉄線ヲ破壞シ其兵力ハ步兵三
四中隊ニシテ逐次兵營ニ進入セリ虎石砬中隊ハ十二時過
北大營ニ在リテ敵兵五六百ト交戦中ニ其一角ヲ占領
セシメ敵ノ機關銃步兵砲ヲ増加シタリ
中隊ハ目下苦戦中野田中尉ハ重傷ナリ」

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斯、如ク日支兩軍衝突し而シ俄ヨリ捷報、之ヲ以テ上
斷然軍、主力ヲ奉天ニ集メ申シ支那軍ニ一撃ヲ加ヘ爾
ヲ一掃シ軍、任務ヲ定ムルニ決セリ、蓋シ當時滿鉄約
一千料、沿線ヲ守備スル我カ國東軍、兵力ハ合計約
一萬人(内奉天ニ約千五百人)ニ過キナリシニ及ビ敵、兵力ハ
奉天、ミナモト規軍約一萬九千ヲ有シ且モ規軍及不
規軍隊ヲ合スル時、東三省、兵力實ニ二十萬ヲ算
スリ故ニ一朝事起ルニ迫ラセラル、時此長延ニ鐵道、
保護ヲ定ムル同胞百萬、生命財產ヲ保全スル爲
ニ最モ迅速ニ軍、主力ヲ集中シ機先ヲ制シ敵最
精銳ヲ奉天附近、軍隊ヲ潰滅ニ導キ東三省、
中冠ヲ制握スル一法アリシニテ、且奉天以南滿鉄線、
掩護ヲ確實ニシテ作戰、自由ヲ確保シ特ニ朝鮮方面
ヨリ、増援部隊輸送ヲ遲滞セラル爲滿鉄線、
近セル凡城、安東及營口附近、支那軍ヲ最モ迅速掃蕩
スルヲ要セシヲ以テナリ

奉天附近、戰鬪

當時偶々軍參謀板垣大佐奉天ニ在リ事件發生ス、
大佐ハ獨斷軍主力、集結ヲ待ツニテ、大攻ヲ發シ
タルニ決心セリ

而シテ大攻、敵ヲ攻撃スル以上同時ニ近ク其側首ヲ
石奉天城内、敵ヲ斃シ壞シ背後、安全ヲ期スルヲ義務
トシ獨立準備步兵第三大隊ニ大攻、敵ヲ步兵第
二九聯隊、之ヲ奉天城、敵ヲ攻撃セム

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北大營 支那軍、頑強ニ抵抗セルヲ我軍、神速ニ破
 殊ニ夜間戦闘ニ熟練シテ、又奉天城内敵相互
 連撃ヲ個々ニ抗戦セルヲ逐次各個ニ撃破セシ交
 戦八時間十九日午前六時頃ニ及ビ奉天城及北大營
 全ク我ヲ有ニ歸セリ

爾後軍主力、逐次到着スニ從ヒ兵工廠、航空處
 東大營等奉天城附近、敵ヲ掃蕩シ十九日午後一時
 頃概ニ敵ノ掃蕩ヲ終セリ
 敗退セル敵ノ主力ヲ以テ瀋海線方面ニ退却ニ一部近
 撫順附近ニ停止シ他、一部、新民方面ニ退却セリ如

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長春附近、戦闘

長春駐劄隊タル歩兵才三旅団(歩兵才二十九聯隊)次ハ十九日午前零時十五分、奉天附近ニ於テ日及兩軍交戦中、ナルヲ知リ、且ケニ主力ヲ以テ奉天ニ向ヒ南下スルニ決シ、出動準備中、午前三時五十分、關東軍司令官ヨリ、長春ニ駐リテ敵ヲ監視スヘキ命令ヲ受ケタリ、然レモ旅団長ハ奉天方面ニ於テ即ニ戰鬥開始セシメタル以上、長春附近ニ於ケル數倍ノ敵ニ對シ、徒ラニ待機スルハ危險ナリト判斷シ、独斷直ケニ附近支那軍ヲ急襲セルモ、敵ハ兵舎ニ據リテ頑強ニ抵抗シ、天明クルニ及ヒ、苦戰ニ陥リ、死傷續出セリ。

獨立守備隊司令官ハ、獨立守備歩兵才一大隊主力ト共ニ、午前六時公主嶺駅ニ於テ、乘車ヲ完了セシカ、此ノ乘車時間、遲キハ長春ニ於テ、列車ヲ編成シ廻送セシメ、依ニ此ノ時迄ニ奉天附近、戰鬥奏功セシニ反シ、長春附近、我が軍甚ク境ニ在ルヲ知リ、獨斷獨立守備歩兵才一大隊主力ヲ長春ニ救援セシメ、自ラ、一小隊ノ護衛兵ト共ニ奉天ニ向ヒ、南下セリ。斯テ獨立守備歩兵才一大隊ハ、南嶺支那兵營ニ向ヒ、歩兵才四聯隊、一部ト協力シ、攻撃ヲ開始シ、激戰ヲ交ヘ、才三中隊

(次頁ニ續ク)

No. 5

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No. 6

如キハ戦闘員六十四名中三十八名ヲ失フニ至シ。
混成第三十九旅團、増援
軍司令官ハ十九日正午奉天ニ到着シ此間概ネ
前述、諸状況ヲ知り歩兵第三十聯隊及
野砲兵第二聯隊ノ重方ヲ長春ニ赴援セシム。
是ヨリ先軍司令官ハ支那軍脅威ニ決スルヤ
朝鮮軍司令官ニ増援ヲ請求スル所アリシカ、同
官、通報ニ依リ朝鮮軍ハ歩兵第三十九旅團
長、指揮スル歩兵五大隊、砲兵二大隊、騎兵二
兵各一中隊ヲ基幹トスル部隊及飛行二中隊
偵察戰鬥各一中隊ヲ関東軍ニ増援シ且該部
隊(飛行隊ヲ除キ)ハ二十日拂曉ヨリ午後二時頃
ノ間ニ奉天駅ニ到着スルヲ知り該部隊到着後
第二師團ニ代リテ奉天附近ノ警備ニ任セシメ第一
師團ハ長春ニ前進セシメ漸次不穩トナシハ市及
吉林ニ前進ノ準備ニ在ラシムルト共ニ一部隊ヲ
鄭家屯及新民附近ニ派遣シ遼河渡河矣
ヲ確保スルニ決セリ蓋シ事態斯ク擴大セル以上
軍ハ遼テ東三省ノ治安ヲ維持シ我居留民ヲ
保護スル、要アリ之ヲ爲ニハ軍ニ滿鉄沿線ノミ
ナラズ吉林及哈市等、治安ヲモ完カラシムルコトハ絶
對ニ必要ト思惟シタレバナリ。

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No. 7

又鄭家屯新民附近遼河渡處、領有通信
及通遼附近並錦州方面、敵狀ニ照シ滿鉄
線ノ確保上必要ナリ。

朝鮮軍増遣隊一時中止

然ルニ關東軍司令官ハ午後十一時朝鮮軍
司令官ヨリ參謀總長、命令ニ依リ増遣
隊ハ一時新義州以南ニ待機スルニ至ル報ニ
接テ軍ハ兵力ノ關係上遼河渡處、確保ハ
放棄スルノ已ムナキニ至ルモ、哈市及吉林、
情況刻々不穩ニ陥ル情勢ヲ呈セル爲メ師
團主力及獨立守備步兵ニ大隊ヲ長春附近
ニ集結セリ。

三、事件擴大ニ關シ閣議決定事項

此、日午後二時陸軍大臣ヨリ左記電報ヲ受領ス

「今回、日支兵衛突事件ニ關シ、支那政府ハ
支那兵力滿鉄線路ヲ破壞セルニ起因セリ、
ニテ非ニ素ヨリ彼ニ存スルモ、事態ヲ擴大セザ
ルハ、極力努ムニ事ニ方針確定セリ」

右御令ノ上行動アリ度

同時參謀總長ヨリ左記電報ヲ受領ス

「九月十八日夜以後ニ於テハ關東軍司令官

ノ決心及兵衛突、機直ニ適シタルモ、ニテ、日

本軍隊、威重ヲ加ヘタルモノト信スアリ。

ニ、事件發生以來支那側ノ態度等ニ
鑑ミ、事件ノ處理ニ関シテハ、必要度ヲ
越ヘサルコトニ閣議ノ決定モアリ從フテ
今後軍ノ行動ハ此主旨ニ則リ善處
セラルヘシ。

四、第二師團ノ吉林派遣

第二師團ノ吉林派遣

十九日午前奉天及長春附近日支兩軍
衝突事件一度傳ハルヤ吉林附近支那
側ノ對日感情ハ漸次不穩トナリ。吉林省
政府首席代理熙洽ハ邦人側ニ對シ爾
今日本居留民保護ニ関シ、責任ヲ取り
難シトハ公言スルニ至レリ又、吉長鐵路局
ヨリ得タル情報ニ依レハ吉林軍ノ主力、
即ニ出動ヲ開始セルモノ、如ク（方面兵
カヲ明）次テ、二十日夕ニ至リ吉林軍顧問
歩兵中佐大迫通貞ノ報告ニ依リ、敵
ハ二十日省城ヲ出テ某方面ニ出動セルヲ
確メ得タリ。

此ノ夜軍司今官ハ午後九時四十五分
吉林居留民會長ヨリ午後一時四十分
發左記電報ヲ受領セリ。

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No. 9

「吉林情勢多急迫、既ニ居留民、家宅ニ發砲セラル、依テ一部
女子、避難ヲ行ヒ、モ残留者、多ク、引揚不能ナル、ミナラス
危険ハ刻々迫リツツアリ此際至急完全ナル現地保護、導
講セラルコトヲ本會、決議ヲ以テ懇願ス
斯、如ク吉林附近ニ於テ、邦人、危険刻々ニ切迫シ猶豫
シ難キ情况トナリ、他方哈市方面、情况モ漸ク不安トナリ
之カ爲軍、ハ在長春第二師團、主カヲ吉林方面ニ派遣
セシカ長延ナル滿鉄沿線、發言備ハ極メテ薄弱トナリ、萬
鉄道ヲ破壞セラルルニ至ル軍、約四百料ヲ距テテ全ク
南北ニ二分セラル、危険ニ陷ル虞アリ、且軍司令官、前電
、如ク參謀總長、陸軍大臣ヨリ事件、擴大深ク戒メ
ラレアリ、以テ吉林派兵ニ就テ、特ニ慎重ナク要セリ、
然レトモ眼前ニ一、鉄道ヲ唯、頼トスル同胞、刻々迫リツ
ツアル危険ヲ直視スル時軍司令官トシテ、然レ視シ得キモノ
非ス、是ニ於テ軍司令官、斷然兵ヲ吉林ニ遣メ、彼ニ擊
ツ與フルハ居留民保護、目的ヲ果スト共ニ他面金支那軍
ノ志氣ヲ阻喪セシメ却テ軍ヲ安全ナラシムル以所ナリト
シ九月二十日在長春第二師團全カヲ吉林ニ派遣スルニ
決セリ第二師團主カハ二十日午前九時五十分長春
發核軍列車ヲ先頭トシ吉林ニ向ヘリ途中師團長ハ
吉林軍大迫顧問ト同行セシ吉林省政府首席代理監給、

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代理五中將ト會同シ入城ニ関スル議定ヲ行ヘリ當時吉
林軍、主力ハ既ニ白軍、威風ニ現シ主力ヲ以テ吉林
北方ニ一部ヲ以テ滿海線方面ニ退避シアリシヲ以テ
平穩裡ニ午後八時迄ニ其主力ヲ吉林ニ集結シ其
治安ヲ維持セリ。朝鮮軍司令官混成第二十九旅
團ヲ獨斷派兵ス。

南東軍司令官ハ此日午後一時稍過鐵道當局ヨリ
混成第二十九旅團、鴨綠江渡河、報ニ接セルモ半信
半疑、裡ニ在リシカ午後二時混成第二十九旅團ヨ
リ左記電報ヲ受領セリ

「混成第二十九旅團ハ二十一日午後一時越境閣下、
隸下ニ入り奉天ニ向フ」

是ニ於テ軍ハ混成第二十九旅團ヲシテ奉天附近、
守備ニ仕セシメテ師團、全力ヲ長春及吉林方面
ニ集結シ情況、變ニ應スル、態勢ヲ救フ為ニ一時
危知ヲ傳ヘラレシ哈市方面、情勢モ漸次沈靜緩
和セリ

五. 錦州、爆撃

奉天附近及沿線各地ニ於テハ敗殘兵及馬賊、跳蕩
シテ掠奪暴行ヲ施シ特ニ鮮人ヲ殺凌辱スルモ甚
カラス依テ軍、積極的ニ之ヲ討伐シ、徒軍ヲ討伐シ鮮人慰
撫ニ努ムルト共ニ一般良民保護ニ任セシメテ漸次回復平穩ニ向ヘリ

No. 10

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此回張學良ハ錦州ニ遼寧省役政府ヲ設置シ各方面ノ軍
隊ヲ同地附近ニ集中シ我が軍ノ後方ヲ攪亂シ其治安ヲ
紊シ更ニ滿鉄東方地区ニ敗走セル敗兵ヲ使張ニ軍ヲ攻撃
セトセリ。爲ニ一旦平靜ニ歸シツアリシ沿派ノ民心稍々動搖
スルニ至レリ。

倭ヲ軍ハ十月八日北江ノ機ヲ以テ錦州附近ヲ偵察セシメ
フルニ彼ハ我ニ向ヒ射撃シ我ニ敵対シテ動ヲ示セシヲ以テ
遂ニ之ヲ爆撃シ其心膽ヲ空カラシメタルニ尚便衣隊
等ヲ使張ニ無戦線ノ戰術ト號シ陰ニ活動ヲ繼續セリ。

六大興附近、戰鬪

戰鬪前、情況

洮陽樓守使張海鵬ハ十月一日獨立ヲ宣言シテ北江ヲ閉塞
途中微弱ナル黑龍江軍ヲ撃退シテ十月中旬敵江右岸
ニ達スルヤ黑龍江軍ハ張海鵬軍ノ北江ヲ阻止スル爲メ十月
十五日洮陽鐵道嫩江橋梁ヲ燒却ス。爲メ同鐵道ノ
運行全ク斷絶スルニ至レリ。

而シテ該鐵道ハ國際交通ノ幹線ナルニテ大帝國借款
鐵道ニシテ全ク元利金ヲ支拂ハサルヲ以テ該鐵道ハ唯一
權限物ナリ。且北滿特產物約二百五十萬噸ノ出廻期ヲ
控ヘ本橋梁ノ破壞セラルハ滿鉄ノ蒙ル損害莫大ナル
ニテ又支那民衆ノ經濟生活ニ影響スル亦大ナリ。

故ニ滿鉄ハ十月二十日洮陽鐵道局顧問技師竹村勝請
以下五名ヲ現場ニ派遣シ實地調査ヲ行ハシメタリ。

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此ニ黑龍江軍ハ竹村等、非戦闘員ヲコトシ
熟知ナリシニ拘ラス無_レ法ニモ射撃ヲセ_レ調登_レ
不能ナラシメタリ

爾後滿鉄ハ齊々哈爾濱水領事ヲ通シ黑
龍江省首席代理馬占山ニ対シ十一月二十九日強
硬ニ抗議シ一周間、期限ヲ附シ十一月三日迄ニ
修理ヲ完了スベキコト若シ之ニ應セサルニ於テハ帝
國ハ實力ヲ以テ修理ヲ行フベキヲ通告セリ

黑龍江省政府ハ十一月三十日より修理ニ着手ス
キヲ約セルモ元ヨリ誠意ナク在_レ再時日ヲ経過セリ
嫩江支隊、派遣

當時嫩江北岸ニ集結シテリシ黑龍江軍ハ步兵
約二千ヲ基幹トセルモノ、如シ斯クテ洮昂鉄道局
及滿鉄會社ハ黑龍江省側、態度ヨリ觀察
シ十一月三日迄ニ修理ヲ完成セサルヲ予察ス所要
ニ應シ翌四日より修理ニ着手シ得ル如ク掩護隊
派遣ヲ早ニ總請セリ

而シテ軍ハ一般情況ニ鑑ミ其使用兵力ヲ最少限
トスルニ決シ步兵第十六聯隊長濱本大佐一指
揮スル嫩江支隊(步兵一大隊、砲兵一大隊、工兵一中隊)

派遣ヲ命セリ、斯クテ嫩江支隊ハ十一月一日夜半
鄭家屯附近ニ集結シ三日早朝同地ヲ奔進シ同夜
泰來附近ニ兵力ヲ集結シ午候ヲ派遣シ諸偵
察ニ着手ス

此馬占山及張海鵬ニ対シ左記通告ヲ交付セリ

Reference Doc. # 1716

No. 13

通告

「非那鐵路局並南滿洲鐵道會社、今同嫩江、江橋附近、鐵道橋ヲ我日本軍掩護、下ニ修理スルコト、アリタルニ、予軍、龍江省軍並張海鵬軍ニ左記事項ヲ通告ス

- 一、爾今嫩江橋梁ヲ戰術的ニ利用スルヲ許サス
- 二、十二月四日正午迄ニ兩軍ハ橋梁ヨリ十吉以外、地ニ撤退シ修理完成迄十吉以内、地ニ入ルヲ許サス

修理完成ノ期日ハ見込ヲ求メテ通告ス
右要求ニ應セサルモニ對シハ日本軍ニ敵意アルモノト認メ、適法ノ武力ヲ行使ス
右警告ス

昭和六年十一月二日

大日本軍司令官 本庄 繁

戰鬪ノ發起

翌十二月三日夜、我工兵ハ破壞セラレタル鐵道橋ヲ徒歩ノ通過ヲ許ス如ク修理シ中隊長以下一部ハ四日午前、三時大興驛南方約三吉、第五橋梁ヲ占領シテ橋梁修理掩護ニ仕マリ、然レニ午前八時三十分頃、黑龍江軍參謀長ハ、我清水齊々哈爾濱領事署ト共ニ同地ニ來リ抵抗ノ意志ヲキヲ表明シ、且正午迄ニ思軍第一線ヲ撤退セシムヘキヲ約シ歸還セリ

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此日朝素濃霧深ク前面、敵情ニ於テハ全ク不明
ナリ、正午歩兵第六聯隊第七中隊ハ黑軍參謀
長ノ言ヲ信ジ前記木五橋梁ヲ出陣シ大砂ノ日
章旗ヲ先頭トシ各兵ハ小砂日章旗ヲ携行シ前
進ヲ開始シ大鹽驛南方ニ達セシ時、突如數方向
ヨリ無法ニモ歩兵第六聯隊ヲ襲撃シ、傷亡
三名ヲ生セルタメ中隊ハ木五橋梁ニ退シ、後退シ支
隊主力ハ來着ヲ待ナリ。

支隊主力ハ不意ノ銃聲ヲ聞キ江橋驛ヨリ急
進シ午後二時頃木五橋梁ニ到着セリ、鐵道沿路以外
ハ濕地ニシテ歩兵ト雖モ通過困難ナリシタメ如
何トモスル能ハス夜暗、至ルヲ待ツ。

支隊ハ此夜拔涉至難ニ濕地ヲ通過シ敵左翼
ニ迂回シ五日拂曉ヨリ攻撃ヲ開始シ一部ノ敵陣
地ヲ奪取セルモ衆ヲ頼メル敵ハ却テ我ヲ包圍スルニ
至リ、刺サヘ午後三時頃トナルヤ左側方面ヨリ約半ノ
集團ハ不意ニ我右側地ニ多ク襲来シ支隊ノ
情況愈々急ム、追ヒテ兵官増援隊來着ヲ待ツニ至
ル増援隊到着。

14
No. 在奉天關東軍司令官ハ四日夕、戰局開始、報
接シ直ニ鄭家屯及長春ヨリ逐次兵ハ力ヲ急ム派セ
ルモ鐵路約四百三十余里ヲ隔テアルヲ以テ、戰場
到着迄ニハ二十余時間ヲ要スル情況ナリ、
六日夜半鄭家屯ヨリ増援セル約大隊ハ戰場ニ到
着シ次午前十時長春ヨリ急ム進セル大隊到着。

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我軍約千四百トナルニ於テ敵モ遂ニ我果敢ニ
 攻撃ニ抗シ兼不多大ノ損害ヲ残ル北方ニ退却
 セリ支隊ハ大興附近ニ陣地ヲ占領シ寧ラ橋梁修
 理掩護ニ仕ヤリ

に昂々溪附近、戦闘

十月七日近ニ大興附近ニ集結セル我カ兵力ハ歩兵約五大隊砲兵五中隊工兵一中隊飛行二中隊ニシテ追撃能力充分ナリシニ拘ラス大興附近ニ停止セル所以、モ、ハニ平和的ニ事件ヲ解決シ其擴大ヲ極力防止センカ爲涙ヲ吞シテ敵愾心ニ燃ウル軍隊ヲ抑制セリ。然ルニ敵ハ我ハ平和的態度ニ反シ近ノ東支線南側地区ニ停止シ其主力ヲ昂々溪附近ニ糾合シ且各方面ヨリモ相當部隊ヲ招致シ九日ニ至リ同地附近ニ集中セル敵兵力ハ歩兵約六千騎兵約三千ニ達シ小興屯三間房附近陣地ハ強度ヲ増加シツツアリ。

一方錦州、敵ハ之ニ策應シ漸次活動ヲ開始シ其使喚スル兵匪約一万ハ遼河ヲ越ヘ南滿線ヲ窺フニ至リ。時恰モ天津方面、情況切迫シ支那駐屯軍ハ同地支那軍ト衝突ヲ惹起セルノ報アリ斯、如ク軍ハ事件擴大防止ニ努ムルモ支那軍一般、情況ハ日ヲ追ツテ積極的トナリ殊ニ馬占山ハ十二日頃ニ於テ既ニ黑龍江軍、殆ト全カ約二万ヲ集中シ馬占山以下衆ヲ恃ミ又學良其他関内各方面、激勵電ニ刺戟セラレ近ノ日本軍ト

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決戦スヘシト豪語シ其騎兵集團ハ我々前面及
右側ニ於テ頓ニ活氣ヲ呈シ来リ到底其衝突ヲ避
ケ難キ有様ナリシヲ以テ軍ハ中央當局ニ具申シ
和戦兩様ノ準備ヲ整ヘ逐次軍ハ主カテ大興附近
ニ集中セリ。此時機ニ於テモ軍司令官ハ和平的ニ事ヲ
解決ヤントシ中央當局ノ意ヲ体シ尙一應ニ馬
占山ニ及有テ求ムルニ決シ十四日穩當ナル條件ヲ提
出シ勸告スル所アリシモ彼ハ殆ト一顧ヲ興ヘス洵昂
線ヲ破壊シテ我々後方ヲ攪乱シ益々挑戦的態度ヲ
採リ依テ軍ハ當時混成第四旅團其他飛行諸隊
内地ヨリ増派中ニシテ三二日頃到着ノ予定アリシヲ以テ之等
ノ兵カヲ合シタル後攻勢ヲ開始スルノ決心ナリト十六七日
ニ到リテハ敵ハ却テ其優勢ナル騎兵集團ヲ以テ
我右側背ヲ脅威シ正面ノ敵亦大ニ活氣ヲ呈シ十
八日未明攻勢ヲ前進シ此アリテ茲ニ於テ第二師團ハ寡
兵ヲ以テ十八日拂曉ヲ攻撃シ轉シ一舉ニ齊々哈爾
濱ニ追撃シ之ヲ占領セシ敗殘ノ敵ハ主力ノ近ク海倫克
山附近ニ在リテ同方面ノ情況極メテ不安ノ情勢ニ在リシヲ以
テ暫ク軍ハ一部ヲ同地ニ駐屯セシムルニ至リ

八、錦州ノ占領

當時支那本部方面ノ輿論硬化シ蔣介石及張學良
之等對内關係ニ左右シタルモノ如ク錦州附近ノ
軍ヲ漸次大凌河以東ニ進メ別働隊ノ活動ト相俟テ
大ニ積極的行動ヲ開始シ来レルハ前述ノ如ク更ニ
錦州及奉山線沿線各地ニ新ニ對日宣戰傳單

No. 17

No. 18

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貼布セラレ對日開戦説盛ナリ

時偶ニ十一月二十六日夜半、軍ハ天津軍參謀長ノ通報ニ依リ天津附近ニ於テ日支兩軍ノ戰端開カレシヲ知り、同軍ノ危急ヲ救フニ決シ、當時奉天附近ニ集結シアリシ混成第四旅團及齊々哈爾第二師團主カラニテ、日錦州方面ニ前進セシムヘク決心シ、其行動ヲ開始セリ。然ルニ同日午後ニ至リ參謀總長ヨリ錦州方面ニ伺ツテスル作戰ノ中、エスヘヤ命令ニ據スルト、又ニ天津方面ノ狀況亦緩和ノ形勢アリシヲ以テ、軍ハ其兵ヲ返シテ滿鉄沿線ニ集結シ、爾後ノ意滿鉄沿線ノ治安維持ニ努メタリ。

(以下次頁)

他方南京政府、前記皇軍錦州附近ニ向ヒ前進ヲ開始スル前後突如
錦州附近中立地帯問題ヲ我ニ提議セルモ、一旦我カ軍奉河以東ニ撤退
ヲ終ルヤ彼ハ中立地帯設定ニ反対ナル旨ヲ宣言シ且該提議ハ寧
ロ日本軍ヨリ提議セリト不信極マル言ヲナシ支那政府、該提議ハ
一ニ我カ錦州攻撃ヲ緩和スル一方便ニ利用セルト明トナリ且
十二月中旬頃ニ至リテ、錦州附近、陣地ハ愈々堅固トナリ同地
附近ニ集結セル敵ノ兵力約三萬五千砲約六十門ニ達シ有力
ナル一部ヲ大凌河以東奉山線及營口支線方面ニ進メ其使
破スル義勇軍、別働隊匪賊、數ハ五六萬ニ達シ遼河、
結氷ト共ニ同河ヲ渡リ滿鉄沿線ヲ窺ヒ之ニ呼應シテ安奉線
方面、匪賊亦漸次活潑ナル行動ヲ開始スルニ至リ、從テ
軍ハ軍ニ滿鉄沿線ヲ守備スル、ミニテハ其任務、達成
困難トナリ、依テ軍ハ十二月下旬ヨリ之等匪賊ヲ討伐
スルニ決シ、先ッ第二師團ヲシテ十二月二十八日遼河、線ヲ出
發シ營口支線ニ沿フ地区、討伐ヲ実施セシメタルカ田庄台
及盤山附近ニ有カナル正規軍ヲ混シタル匪賊ト交戦スル
ニ至リ、斯ク遼西ノ匪賊ハ支那正規軍、支援ヲ受ケアルコ
ト明瞭トナレル以上南滿ニ於ケル治安ヲ維持スルカ爲
ニ錦州附近支那正規軍ヲ撃滅スルヲ以テ絶体必要トセリ茲
ニ於テ軍主力ハ三十日ヨリ奉山線ニ由リ前進ヲ開始セルトコロ曩
ニ暴慢ナリシ錦州附近、敵モ皇軍ノ威武ニ屈シ戦ハステ閣内
ニ撤退ヲ開始セリ爲ニ錦州附近ハ時無警察狀態ニ陥リ治安紊
シトセラシテ軍ハ直ニ第二十師團ヲ錦州附近ニ進メ第二師團
ハ直ニ滿鉄沿線ニ引揚グルニ至リ

九 哈市派兵

吉林省内於、哈市、新政府、帰服、したる、一部、哈爾濱、賓縣、
方面、蟠踞、賓縣、反吉林政府、組織、匪、哈市、施政、妨害、再、
、勸告、行、つ、帰順、を、爲、吉林省、民、漸、々、安、定、を、爲、す、に、依、
り、吉林政府、六月、十日、軍事、行動、開始、し、北、向、雲、東、軍、に、交、
り、衝突、一、派、政、争、渦、中、入、り、於、て、嚴、重、中立、態度、保持、す、
吉林軍、兩、軍、反、吉林軍、に、互、に、一、月、下、旬、哈爾濱、賓、縣、外、
一、月、二十、日、ハ、哈爾濱、賓、縣、に、於、て、兩、軍、主、力、戦、斗、を、起、せ、し、
是、次、立、ち、反、吉林軍、を、逐、つ、哈爾濱、賓、縣、附近、に、増、援、隊、を、送、り、其、一、部、
掠、奪、開始、し、同、地、店、留、邦、人、四、名、被、害、を、爲、る、事、發、生、し、朝鮮、人、
捕、獲、人、數、名、拉、致、せ、し、事、我、店、留、民、同、地、人、約、四、十、朝鮮、人、約、五、
十、名、に、危、險、愈、々、迫、り、依、り、軍、に、兵、三、大、隊、を、基、幹、と、し、部隊、を、
店、留、民、保護、爲、哈市、に、派、兵、す、に、決、し、兩、軍、に、對、し、店、留、民、保護、
外、何、等、意、思、を、持、つ、追、撃、す、然、し、反、吉林軍、東、及、南、線、を、破、
壞、し、輪、転、材、料、を、沒、收、し、我、方、輸、送、に、極、力、妨、害、す、蓋、し、反、吉林軍、
、意、圖、は、日本、軍、に、北、上、を、極、力、阻、止、し、北、向、吉林軍、を、牽、引、し、日本、
軍、を、牽、引、し、與、之、を、北、上、に、利、新、を、せ、し、依、り、軍、に、三、大、隊、を、孤、立、哈市、
に、前、進、せ、し、に、危、險、を、極、力、察、し、第三、師、團、主、力、に、應、じ、遂、に、交、戦、し、
六月、二十、日、に、牽、引、し、哈市、を、占、據、せ、し、敵、に、徹、底、的、打、撃、を、与、へ、し、に、能、け、
し、に、は、北、滿、に、不安、を、掃、く、に、能、け、し、之、を、爲、す、今、第三、師、團、同、
地、に、停、り、同、方面、に、治安、を、全、く、に、保、つ、に、せ、り、

一〇 目下、於、て、軍、の、配備

軍、に、前、述、如、く、北、滿、治安、未、だ、回復、せ、し、現、況、に、依、り、軍、の、約、半、部、
を、以、て、哈市、及、齊、齊、哈爾、に、配置、し、約、半、部、を、以、て、奉、天、省、に、治安、完、
ら、し、め、爲、す、其、中、主、力、を、錦、州、州、直、に、三、部、を、奉、天、省、に、配置、し、